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A LAWYER LOOKS AT PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
AL-FRED L. GAUSEWITZ*
(Editor'sNote: The place of the scientist in a court of law is
ever a problem. The latest contribution to resolve the existing
confusion is 'Psychiatry and the Law' by Dr. Guttmacher,M. D.,
the Ohief Medical Officer on the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
and Dr. Weihofen, Professor of Law at the University of New
Mexico. New York : Norton 1952. Pp viii, 461. $7.50. The
combined approach of the authors has prorapted the 'Review' to
secure the impressions of a lawyer and a psychiatrist in viewing
the book.)

Once upon a time many years ago I was on a University
committee to publish a pamphlet outlining the work of the University against delinquency and crime. The sociologist on the committee submitted a drawing for the cover of the pamphlet which
depicted Justice blindfolded against social knowledge. I mildly
remonstrated that Justice is blindfolded against irrelevant and
improperly prejudicial knowledge. The picture was redrawn to
show the social sciences bringing knowledge to a receptive Justice.
But the sociologist was not wholly wrong. Psychiatry an-d The
Law essentially exhibits the knowledge that psychiatry has for
the law hnd the extent to which the law avails itself of or ignores
or frustrates use of that knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge of
something and, in the law, is utilized by some person for some
purpose. Although law is in one sense a disembodied thing, it is
determined, stated, and applied by men. What these men will, or
should, desire to know will depend upon what they are trying to
do. What are the ultimate ends and the intermediate ends called
means that men seek to achieve through law? Is there psychiatric
knowledge that is essential for choosing between possible ends?
Has the lack of that knowledge led to mistakes? The very publication of this book implies an affirmative answer to each of these
questions. It also implies that at least some men are still ignorant
and continuing in error. We therefore need to know what knowledge there is, what more is needed, and how to arrange things so
as to get it. We need to know what mistakes have been and are
still being made. We also must think a moment about who "we,"
the men who are the "law," are.
The authors state the aim of the law by way of saying that
"psychiatry helps law to focus on its goal, the development of the
individual's potentialities for freedom and productiveness."1 But
* Dean, University of New Mexico, College of Law.
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has man any capacity for freedom-the old problem of free will
versus determinism? One answer would seem to be that it is beside
the point, or that we have not asked the right question. We act,
and must act, as if we have the power to make choices and to plan,
including the making of plans for modifying and controlling our
own and other people's choices and behavior. The job. of the
"law" is to control human behavior, for that is the only way it
can achieve its ultimate goal of the good life. But to control behavior we must be able to predict it. To predict it we must assume
that it is caused and that we can know its causes. So we must also
act as if our behavior is determined. Man by his very nature will
strive toward goals and in his striving he will necessarily assume
that he and others have the power to choose and also assume,
with a seeming inconsistency, that his choices are determined.
We, and what is the same thing, the "law," are forever seeking simple solutions. We seek one single cause of human misbehavior. We assume that cause to be the human will and let that
assumption dominate our thinking while we are also acting as if
this human will is not completely free, frequently flopping over
to the other extreme of finding a single cause in poverty or lack of
religion or whatsoever is our chief interest. That is confusing and
leads to a confused law. The authors say that "free will is the
chief cornerstone of the criminal law."' They could have said it
of all law and of all life. They recognize that the basic task is to
learn the factors that cause human behavior or determine the will.
They assert that psychiatry can greatly assist in that work.
They conclude that upon the success of that work will depend
man 's success in achieving his goal, which to us means "democratic
freedom," '3 "a world fit for the individual to live in and to realize
and express his own individuality," a "world order" 4 or world
law. But free will should not be the "chief" cornerstone of law.
At the very least we should not attempt to control the will by the
device of punishment and rewards alone, especially with the latter
being very frugally used. Operations on motive alone are not
sufficient. We must also use other devices and include conditions
that will make it possible for good will to be maintained.5
And so the authors answer the questions, "what knowledge,"
and "for what purposes?" in their brief first chapter. The goal
is freedom. But "the very concept of freedom . . . is impossible
2. Id. at 4.
3 Id. at 11.
4. Id. at 460.

5. WAiTE, THE PR.VE TioN oF FvTURE Cram 27 (1943), makes the point:
"Though it may in theory create a will to refrain, it does not create a capacity to
refrain."
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without appreciation of the psychological fact that even the most
fairminded individual is likely to be misled by his prejudices."1
"Until we understand the nature of the aggressive impulses that
lead to anti-social conduct, our efforts to control such conduct, in
are not likely to be
the international as well as the domestic field,past.'
7
the
in
been
have
they
more successful than
They do not mean
It is to be noticed that they say "we."
"every one but-me." Even the most brilliant are subject to
prejudices and likely to fall into stereotyped thinking. Therefore
it is worth repeating the conmmonplace that in a very real sense
men are the law, not merely those lawyers, judges, and other public functionaries who administer and apply it, nor even these plus
those legislators, judges, and administrators who have the authority to enact or state it. Private citizens play a part in administration as informers, complainants, witnesses, parties, jurors, and
in legislation as the voting or not voting constituents of legislators,
of judges, and of governors who appoint administrators and
others. In a democracy, and probably ultimately in a dictatorship,
their attitudes and gossip count. To some extent we are all communications media in our own right and as parties to, by being
purchasers of, the products of the newspapers, radio, television,
and the movies. Therefore, it is essential to straight thinking that
each of us know and feel that law is not provided for. us but
created, or at the very least stated and applied, by us, and that
although we may, indeed must, feel free and insist upon being free
to think, speak, strive and choose and plan for ourselves and
others, we must at the same time realize that we cannot understand freedom unless we are also aware that there are factors that
will determine our choices and of what these factors are. "Cause
and effect operate with crime [and all other behavior, good or bad,
civil or criminal?] and mental disorder not less than with physical
illness. Causal factors may be difficult to trace but we can have
no insight into the nature of the problem unless we start with the
premise of causality." ' That statement is itself a fundamental
insight. When we are faced with seemingly inconsistent or incompatible things, such as free will and determinism or reformation and deterrent punishment, and by the very nature of things
must have both, the most that we can do and the very least that we
must do is to choose, not between them on an all-or-nothing basis,
but which we shall "start with," which is to dominate in case of
conflict and which is to dominate our aims and thinking. If we are
thinking exclusively or chiefly in terms' of "free will" when we
6. GUTTMACHER
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 453.

AND WEIHOFEN,
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should also be thinking also or chiefly in terms of determinism,
then the question of free will versus determinism is not irrelevant
but should be rephrased to ask which we should "start with" in
our thinking. And by "we" is meant all of us. Tell us more, one
is tempted to say. The authors spell it all out in subsequent chapters. Ohapters two to eight tell us what psychiatric knowledge
there is by expositions of personality formation, the psychoneuroses, the manic-depressive and schizophrenic psychoses, the
psychopaths, sex offenders, organic brain disorders, and congenital intellectual deficiency, all with illustrative cases and reference to laws where appropriate. Thereafter the discussion centers
around procedural and substantive law.
II
The good life, which has been mentioned as the aim of law,
is very nearly an ultimate goal. In taking up less ultimate goals
I shall do what the authors have done in effect and divide the subjeet into procedural law and substantive law, noting, however,
as they have on occasion, that the division cannot be clean-cut,
for substantive values may override procedural and the converse.
Indeed, the law has difficulty in maintaining many of its differentiations and its attempts to do so are often confusing as, for example, the distinctions between law and fact and between fact
and opinion.
Procedural law has for its goal, (in addition to providing a
guide for an orderly, efficient, and economical procedure as little
as possible subject to perversion to improper ends by using concealment and surprise or the like as tactics) the arrival at true,
or more or less probably true, answers to questions that are
susceptible of true or false answers. Opposed to such questions,
which may be called questions of fact, are questions which call for
value judgments and may be called questions of law. They call
for answers which are not true or false but more or less wise,
fair, just or politic. Procedural law tells us not only the procedures by which but also the person who, and the qualifications
of the person who, is to answer questions of one type or the other
and whether the same person is to answer both. That is, as the
authors amply demonstrate, very important. The most difficult
problem may very well be to decide the qualifications of the person who is to have the say. Whoever he is, he should not be guided
by his emotions. Psychiatric knowledge should be available to
him and the procedure should be such that it will be. I have
mentioned the legislature and the part that unofficial persons play
in the legislative process. The authors note legislative determinations made without psychiatric information or upon misinforma-
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tion as a result of pressures from a misinformed public.' The
authors are, however, concerned mainly with the judicial process
for determining questions of fact in disputes between individuals
and between individuals and the state. They deal with the expert
witness, then take up the important questions of who is to have the
say and what procedures are to be used for commitment and for
the adjudication of incompetency. They discuss the reliability of
human testimony; give a very generous and optimistic estimate of
the extent to which the law permits the use of the psychiatrist s
opinion of the reliability of a witness with what they obviously
consider an unfortunate example from the Hiss case; and tell
about the lie detector, truth serum, blood-grouping tests (which
affords an occasion to remark that psychiatric knowledge and
witnesses may be taken as an example or a prototype of all behavioral disciplines if not for all special knowledge and expert
witnesses), self-deception, suggestibility (leading questions and
the press), defensive and imaginative lying, delusions, pathological
lying, and confessions. This brings us back to truth as the goal of
procedural law.
They open with a possibly startling but true statement: "The
court's function is not to decide the actual facts of what happened' ' and then make another statement that may add bewilderment to astonishment, viz., that this is "a rational method of
trial.""' Whether they really believe it to be rational remains to

be seen, for they find many defects in it. In truth, however, they
are here and throughout the book modest, and moderate, and
careful,-at least as moderate as Professor E. M. Mforgan, the
draftsman of the Model Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute, who has said among other things that "The law of evidence is in such a confused and confusing condition that it is
almost impossible to draft a rule which is universally accepted
without qualifications."' 2 The authors could have, as do some
lecturers on crime before women's clubs, secured an easy triumph
by listing every defect anywhere as though it obtained everywhere
and without any reason for it or effort to correct it. They are
careful to do the opposite.
When they say that a tiial "is not a search for objective
truth"' 3 they are describing the adversary method of trial and
doing it with every proper emphasis, for that method is indeed,
as they say it is, the source of many difficulties and therefore of
9. E.g., id. at 110. 349.
10. Id. at 205.
11. Id. at 207.
12. MoDEL CODE OF EvmFNcE 50 (1942).
13. GUrI!ACHEm AND WEm FaN, op. cit. .upra note 1, at 205.
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many defects. That system provides the "third party" which
many of us wish we had for international disputes. Under it the
judge, even in criminal cases contrary to the "inquisitorial" or
"investigative" system on the Continent, is an impartial (although he ought not to be disinterested or inactive) administrator
of a proceeding in which each party makes his respective contentions and brings in information (evidence) to sustain them.
The typical trial is taken to be before a jury as the trier of the fact
under the administration of the judge. A difficulty will at once be
noted when it is remembered that most trials are to a judge
without a jury, for then he administers himself. The trial is also
administered to a large extent by the adversaries who decide what
information to bring in, what evidence to object to, etc. The trial
is "on the record." i. e., on evidence introduced in court. It is
not what the parties, or the judge (unless the matter is indisputable), or even the newspapers know or think they know that
counts, but what the evidence proves. I would therefore say that
it is not strictly true that "It is not a search for objective truth"
but it is true that "The court's function is . . . to decide what has
been proved or failed to be proved by the evidence which the
parties have produced.""4 It is not a scientific investigation, but
it should be remembered that scientific investigations are not concerned with active disputes about past events, acts, and conditions
for the ascertainment of which reliance must be placed almost
exclusively upon reports by human beings who are, as the authors
clearly show, highly fallible even when reporting at first hand
and not, as must often be the case, through hearsay. More importantly, there are other values more important than truth, as the
authors recognize, so that the problem is even more difficult than
that of the historian. The system is intended to provide a person
with a decision by one whom he has the opportunity to inform
fully as to the facts of the particular case, as to the law, and as to
everything else that is, and to exclude everything that is not,
proper to be considered,-all to the end that the decision will be
made by one who is not only fully informed but properly motivated. That is the system that we prefer for what may be called
the usual lawsuit or trial
There are many places in our law where the adversary system is not followed. The authors have many suggestions for further departures, almost all of which have the support of model
acts and the like which they cite, but there is not space to detail
them. Rules for the examination and cross-examination of expert
witnesses, however sound in theory, do not work. Expert wit14. Ibid.
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nesses should not be chosen, or chosen exclusively, and paid by the
adversaries; that temptation for the expert to consider himself
an advocate should be removed. Procedures should provide adequate and, where indicated, routine observation of all persons
whose mental condition is relevant. The patient's privilege of
silence should be abolished except for psychiatric patients, which
latter suggestion is, so far as I know, original with the authors
but for which they make a strong case. Court clinics are described. For commitment and adjudication of incompetency proceedings the authors would greatly modify the procedures in
jurisdictions which still require a judicial hearing with procedures
too much like criminal, with notice to the subject and his presence
at the hearing, and which require or permit trial by jury. They
would permit commitment as do many states without judicial trial
but on the certificate of two physicians, "because it is a blunderbuss method to require elaborate formalities in all cases, in order
to avoid abuse in a few."' 5 Voluntary admission, problems of
release, and all other phases of the problem are carefully considered and the model act of the National Institute of MHental
Health described.
It will be noted that commitment on certificate of physicians
goes to the question of who is to have the say. Are decisions to
be "medical" or "social"?'
If both, as they necessarily are, can
physicians take the responsibility with risks of civil suits or
criminal penalties if they make a mistake 717 The problem is more
acute in cases of commitment where liberty is involved than in
cases of adjudication or guardianship which involve civil rights to
manage property. But in any case there will be questions of degree and estimates of risk to be taken, value judgments for which
there are no objective tests or true or false answers. To give
psychiatrists the responsibility (assuming that there are enough
of them and that qualifications can be specified, problems not
neglected by the authors)' 8 is a sure way of bringing psychiatric
knowledge to the "law." I judge that commitment on physicians'
certificate followed by a judicial hearing on demand, a sort of
right of appeal or review, has been sufficiently tested and has
proved sound and not too dangerous to the physicians. Surely
the physicians can be given the requisite immunity from penalties for honest mistakes and they should not ask -for more.
When we turn from such cases to the cases of criminals, however, the problem becomes more difficult, especially in the cases
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 304.
See id. at 66, 69, 79, 289 for examples of the conflicting policies.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 292. 380.
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of "normal" criminals. It is very significant that there has
always been a tendency to treat mental cases as criminals.
Treatment has been shamefully neglected in both cases. Progress
has been from mere custody (restraint) or worse to therapeutic
treatment (restraint and cure), with the progress much slower,
scarcely perceptible in fact, in the case of criminals.'" It is certainly wrong to treat mental cases as criminals are now treated.
Whether it would be wrong to treat "normal" criminals as mental
cases ought to be treated is a basic question that involves the
whole problem of "punishment," to be next discussed. At this
point I simply say that I still believe that "a tribunal composed of
experts qualified to evaluate psychiatric, psychological, and
sociological data," which the authors suggest 0 could not and
should not be asked to carry the responsibility. 21 As long as punishment (a thing that cannot be measured) remains a consideratioti
and until the psychiatrists have more knowledge than the authors
claim with reference to "normal" criminals, a board should
be made up of men chosen because of their integrity and genera]
wisdom rather than for their special knowledge. As I believe
Moley once put it, the specialists should serve as handmaidens to
justice.
III
The ultimate goal of the substantive law is also the good life,
which for us is the democratic way insured by constitutional
limitations on the powers of the state and by "the rule of law."
Purposes must be approved by those who make the laws, and
officials must be legally authorized to carry them out. A difficulty,
the difficulty as I view it, is that ends and means are not explicitly
stated. The result is that officials may not know what they are
supposed to accomplish or how. They therefore may not know
what information they need or even that they need any. They
operate on whatever assumptions each consciously or unconsciously may make. This violates "the rule of law" principle and results in confusion.
In civil cases the job at hand is fairly clear. Commitment,
adjudication of incompetency, and appointment of guardians have
been discussed under procedure. The test of what constitutes incompetency will vary with the variance in purpose of the field of
law involved,-contracts (including deeds, etc.), wills, marriage
and divorce, and torts are discussed. Only on the subject of
19. Id. at 133, 294, 444.
20. Id. at 445.
21. GAUSEWITZ, CONSIDERATIONS
508 (1936).

BASIC TO A NEW

PENAL

CODE,

11 Wis. L. REV.
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torts are the writers unable to state the purpose of the law. The
writers were able to state the rule of liability for torts, but were
forced to add that "Text-writers and courts in dicta commonly
laid down a serious qualification of the rule." '22 Guardianship
proceedings "are solely for his own benefit and the protection of
his estate. The test . . . is whether his mental faculties are so

impaired as to render him incapable of protecting himself or
properly managing his property. ' 23 The law of contracts is complicated by the fact that there are at least two persons involved,
both of whom have a right to the law's assurance that they will
not be disappointed in their reasonable expectations of the fulfilment of promises. "It is not enough to say that it is unjust to
hold the person legally bound who is mentally incapable of understanding the import of the transaction. The other party may
be equally innocent and may have acted in good faith. 2 4 Therefore, "in all such cases when incompetency is raised as a defense,
two questions have to be answered: 1. What type or degree of
mental disorder will the law recognize for this purpose? . . 2.
What legal effect flow from such incompetency?" The answer to
the first question is that the person must have "had sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the particular transaction.1 25 The answer to the second question does
not involve psychiatry. In the case of wills, the purpose of the law
of undue influence and competency is to prevent the putting into
effect as his will that which is not his will. The question is, therefore, whether the maker of the will was able "to understand the
condition of his estate, his obligations towards those . -

.

who

have legal or moral claims upon him, and the import and effect of
the provisions of his will.'

'26

The problem is to avoid restricting

the right to dispose of property at death, and the law, therefore,
recognizing that old people have the right to make a will, and
that "in old age, some impairment of intellectual acuity and of
memory is normal"'27 is said to require "less mind to make a will
than to make a contract." ' 28 The writers suggest that "this seems

much too broad. In either case, the question must be addressed to
the particular transaction involved."' One need not go on to take
up marriage and divorce. The point is that in all of these cases,
except in the law of torts, which has more than a slight infusion
of punitive justice, the purpose, of the law is fairly clear and the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

GuTTMACR
Id. at 325.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 345.
Ibid.
Id. at 346.

AND WVEHOEN,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 357.
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psychiatrist may be used to describe the actual mental condition
of the subject.
But such is not the case in the criminal law where "1punishment" intrudes itself and contaminates both the substantive and
procedural law. It contaminates because, unless we go back to
the lex talionis, there is no yardstick or measure for it.2" That is
a sufficient reason for ruling it out as a dominant method for use
in the usual case or for use in our thinking. There is no need for
indulging in moral speculations about it or its relation to the
problem of free will. "Punishment" is a pain inflicted for retaliation, retribution, expiation, or what have you, for past acts or,
looking to the future, to prevent future crimes by deterring other
potential offenders, by vindicating the law by educating the public,
by preventing lynch-law or nullification, etc. For any of these
purposes it cannot be measured. The moral issue involved is
whether in a democracy a human being should unnecessarily be
subjected to pain deliberately inflicted by his fellow men who have
no way of knowing how much they are making him suffer; unnecessarily because there are other ways for which there is at least
some knowledge available and -which gives promise of producing
further knowledge. Pain inflicted to deter the individual subjected to it is not "punishment" but "reformation," perhaps
*even "rehabilitation" if it can be said to create a capacity as well
as a will to behave. Neither can it be measured, but no one
will suggest putting a man in a cage for periods rounded off at
one, two, five, ten, or twenty years for this purpose. Today, when
lashing or solitary confinement is permitted at all, it is strictly
limited by law.
The authors do not attempt an exhaustive rationale of punishment. They discuss it in its relation to the irresistible impulse
problem, 30 to insanity at the time of execution, 81 and generally.2
They refer to it as "the sanction upon which the criminal law so
utterly relies.'m By and large they give it the treatment that it
deserves, they scorn it. But that is not the treatment that it requires. It dominates the thinking of most of us and may catch
the most sophisticated.
29. 4 B Comm. *11: "As to the end or final cause of punishment. This is not
by way of atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for this must be left to
the jurt determination of the Supreme Being..." Blackstone does attempt to measure
guilt and punishments.
30. GUTTIACHER AND WEI oFEN, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 412.
31. Id. at 436.
32. Id. at 444.
33. Id. at 123.
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so
They say that "There are some radical theorists who go "-4
.
disordered
mentally
are
criminals
far as to say that all
that "translating this (determinism of some degree) into the concept that all malefactors are mentally sick people is a reductio ad

absurdum'";3 1 that "The authors are completely out of sympathy

with those who maintain that6 all criminals are sick people and
These are emphatic, bold, and
should be treated as such." 3
forthright statements of what may appear to be a timid or regressive position. But the authors are neither timid nor regressive.
Prudently disarming, perhaps, of those who are quick to charge
coddling or "country club prisons" against any one who would
treat prisoners like human beings, but actually bold and" radical,"
if they will pardon the word since I do not follow it with "theorists" and use it in the sense of going to the root of the matter.
The context from which I lifted the quoted phrases and the entire
book show that they simply mean that there are criminals who
can be classified as "normal" and thus distinguished from the
mentally deficient or disordered. "They ('normal criminals') are
the individuals who have been reared in homes and neighborhoods with defective social standards and have incorporated these
standards as their own." 3 7 These "normal criminals" constitute
65% to 75% of the total, and perhaps there should be added to
these the occasional or accidental criminals who would add another 5% .38
The crucial question is whether the psychiatrist has any
knowledge that would enable him to make reliable predictions
about them. He has.3 9 They plump for the wholly indeterminate
sentence, although they would let it be passed by the judge because "The symbol of the wise -and just father, punishing wrongdoers, probably adds to the stability of society and to the average.
40
To "restraint" they would
individual's feeling of security."
add therapeutic efforts at "cure" and treat the person on the basis
of his social dangerousness, including of course, since they are
speaking of "normal criminals," dangerousness having social
causes.4 ' Their proposal would include the abolitibn of the insanity defense4 2 and is therefore more radical than those laws
which attempted to abolish it as early as 1909 but were held un34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87, 385.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 14, 18.
Id. at 445-446.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 446.
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constitutional.43 They approve the principle of the only true
wholly indeterminate sentence laws that have been enacted and
sustained, the sexual psychopath laws, and criticize them only because they are based upon the fallacious premise that "sex offenders are a distinct type, more recidivistic than other criminals, and
that they can be treated by special techniques" 44 and because they
4
"typically make no provision for treatment.1

Recognizing that

treating a person on the basis of his dangerousness is itself
dangerous to individual liberty and freedom if left to uncontrolled administrative discretion, 4 they would provide, as does
the Youth Correction Authority Act 47 and as they suggested for
the non-criminal committed to hospitals on a certificate of physicians, 4 for a hearing after commitment. As previously mentioned, they would leave treatment and, I take it, release, to a
"tribunal composed of experts." 49 I assume that they would
leave release on probation to the judge.
How radical can one be? Or rather, how radical must one be?
Mounting crime statistics do not indicate half-way or piecemeal
measures. The present system, whatever it is, is inadequate.
Except for the board of experts, I would say that they are just
radical enough. As to the board of experts, dangerousness is so
much a matter of degree and there are so many value judgments
involved that the responsibility should be left to the "law" in the
form of a board composed of men more representative of and
sensitive to the public than a board of specialists appointed solely
because of their special knowledge could be. "Criminology cannot be purely 'scientific'; it must face choices based on ethics, on
an articulate philosophical position regarding the relationship of
the individual to society.' ° For this "articulate philosophical
position" I would substitute an authoritative statement by the
legislature that our treatment of the ordinary case of the true
criminal (by which I mean those whose indicated dangerousness is
great enough to justify the trouble and expense of a regimen of
restraint and cure, excluding the misdemeanants by and large,
for whom I would reserve exclusively deterrent penalties) is to
have the prevention or control of future crime as its purpose and
restraint and cure as its method, the restraint to be made as
short in duration as possible by efforts at rehabilitation and' as
43. Id. at 450.
44. Id. at 132.

45. Id. at 133:
46. Id. at 447.

47. Id. at 451.

48. Id. at 297-298.
49. Id. at 445.
50. Id. at 447.
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mild in degree as possible by release under supervision. I would
add, to forestall newspaper and other efforts to abolish the system
the first time one of the inevitable mistakes in prediction was
made, a statement to the effect that occasional mistakes are expected, and a statement giving permission to utilize purely deterrent or even purely vindictive punishment in extraordinary cases.
The authors would not, I take it, wholly abolish punishment.
Nor would I. One very practical reason is that it cannot b
abolished (from the point of view of the criminal, his friends ahd
relatives and the public) so long as he is subjected to restraint.
But I would leave it as an incidental by-product in the case of the
usual run of criminals', to be measured by whether the criminal
has become safe to be at large. I know of no other yardstick for
punishment and no other provides a motive and responsibility for
gathering the predictive data that are so badly needed even unde#
the present system of limited indeterminate sentences. The fa'
is that it is the yardstick now in use and probably the one thit
always has been in use whenever the need for a measure occurred.' 1
Judging from what has thus far been published about it by
those in charge, the model criminal code now being drafted by the
American Law Institute will work out substantially the program
of the authors. It is a sound program. The criminal law does
not attempt a definition of the good life nor does it specify ways
to it. It is negative. It specifies certain results of human behavior that are considered sufficiently evil to justify the prohibition under criminal sanctions of the behavior that causes these
Tesults. Such acts are made crimes. The good life and ways
toward it cannot be specified by the law and enforced by it, at
least in a democracy, because these are individual matters aild
law, when it specifies in advance, must be general. It cannot b6
so general as to say in effect that each individual must lead a
constructive life and it does not have the wherewithal to be more
specific. It can and does specify what must not be done. Whnh
an individual violates one of these prohibitions, however, the matter becomes an individual problem. The law can become individual and does so, not by legislative or judicial law, but by administrative law-administrative criminal law, to use a term that appears never to have gotten into the books or into the indexes and
digests. The law can then say to an individual that he not only
must refrain from destructive behavior but that he must demonstrate that he is capable of leading a constructive and personally
51. See 1 WHARTON, A TRaArisE ON Camnw. LAw § 12 (8th ed, 1880) who,
however, speaks of. dangerousness in terms of "guilt" measured by the offense largely,
but not entirely, for he would also consider age and prior history to the extent of
recidivism.
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satisfying life or remain under restraint. It can assist him by
suggesting what is for him a satisfying life and in teaching how to
live it. If he cannot or will not become a person of good will,
he will have to be kept under whatever degree of restraint is necessary for the protection of the public. Obviously such a program
is not greatly different from the partially indeterminate sentence.
The essential difference is that it would compel all persons concerned in its administration to focus on the potentialities of the
individual for good or evil. They could not shift their responsibility to the "law" by pointing to a sentence of a certain number of years, maximum or minimum. They would not be compelled to release a dangerous person because his maximum term
had expired. They would not have the easy excuse for retaining
a person fit to be at large that the minimum or a certain portion of
the maximum of his sentence had not been served. They would
be forced, I should think, to resort to the knowledg'e that the
specialists could provide. And both they and the specialists would
have strong incentives to build up a body of knowled1e and experience for use in making the-necessary predictions. This knowl.
edge should also be useful for a program of prevention, wherein
lies the only real hope'.
The final chapter, "Ounces of Prevention," makes it clear
that a program of prevention offers only a desperate hope unless
it is commenced very early in the life of each child. "Cause and
effect operate with crime and mental disorder no less than with
physical illness. Causative factors may be difficult to trace, but
we can have no insight into the nature of the problem unless we
start with the premise of causality. In the vast majority of
criminal careers there are evidences of social maladjustment
stretching back into childhood.1 5 2 It would seem that until people
can be educated for the profession of parenthood we shall need
some very commodious accommodations for restraint even though
full use be made of restraints outside of institutions under probation and parole. This brings up the problem of money for
facilities and staffing as well as the short supply of psychiatrists
and other specialists, which the authors duly note. The fact that
such a program would be less expensive than huge prisons seems
thus far to have made little impression except in the federal
service.
And what of the insanity defense which has been the most
controversial and written about subject of criminal law? The
program would abolish it. In fact, carried to a conclusion that
would eliminate punishment the program would abolish the crim52.
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inal law as we have known it. "There is no more need for the law
to exact retribution from the criminal, according to this view,
than there is for doctors to become angry with a diseased individual." 53

But we, including doctors, do become angry with

diseased individuals and feed our appetities for scandal and blood
with newspaper accounts of their sexual and other aberrations.
We believe that we can judge conduct on a moral basis and we
therefore pass our prejudices on to our children in such a way as
to make certain that they will become imbued with inner conflicts
and develop the "aggression for aggression's sake" that is bound
to result from the frustrations and feelings of insecurity that such
conflicts cause.54 We therefore shall have to deal with insanity
tests for some time to come and the authors give it substantial
space in their book.
The weakness and the strength of the old right and wrong
test is that it assumes the existence of what the philosophers
throughout the ages have sought but failed to find-an absolute
and objective standard of right and wrong. Good and evil we
may know and we may classify the results of conduct under them.
And we can classify conduct that brings evil results as wrong,
but that does not get us far. For conduct to be immoral the actor
must have foreseen the result and appreciated its evilness. But
if it is future results that we are inteirested in preventing and it
can be predicted that a person will so act as to make undesirable
results likely, it is of slight importance, except for the type of
treatment he must undergo, whether or not he can truly foresee
and appreciate the evilness of the result. One type of treatment
for criminals and another for the insane, however, leaves a difference so long as one carries a stigma which the other does not. I
think that the law should take the first step to remove the difference which creates the stigma. It is true that "We must gutard
against the naive assumption that a revolution in practice and in
thinking can be accomplished by enacting a statute. Merely
changing the name from punishment to correctionwill not of itself
work a change in. fact. Putting the paper program into effectf
would require changing the outlook and habits of the 'whole
hierarchy of administrators, from judges and wardens down to
policemen and prison guards [and, I would add, all the rest of us]
-a prodigious task."
The fact that one move will not accomplish the entire result, however, does not mean it would not be a
start. I repeat, therefore, that I would have the legislature say
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id. at 459.
55. BAHM, PHmosoO y-AN INTRODucrION 310-312 (1953).
56. GuTrTmACHER AND WEIHOPEi, op. cit. supra note 1, at 447.
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that the aim is the prevention of future harms and that the
method is restraint and cure; I also repeat that this is right now
the essence of our method in the case of true crimes, except that
the "cure" part of the formula is extremely inadequate in most
jurisdictions, to say the most for it. I also repeat that the controlling moral problem involved is that in a democracy it is immoral and bad policy to inflict punishments which cannot be measured and to do so unnecessarily. I wish that some df those who
advocate -punishment as a dominant and primary method of the
criminal law would do as Blackstone and many other legal and
philosophical writers did; they at least recognized that the problem of punishment involves a problem of measuring it. Let the
law rough it off in round figures when it must, but let it use measures other than a clock or a calendar when other gauges are available.
I can see no objection to the addition of the irresistible impulse test, whether or not there is such a thing as an irresistible
impulse, if it will make the psychiatrist more at home in the court
room or constitute a step in the direction of abolishing insanity
tests. The same is true of the New Hampshire test, as well as of
an interpretation of the right and wrong test that would utilize
the same or similar data in the interpretation of the word "know."
It is perfectly sound and proper trial advocacy to "outflank" the
legal tests5" in particular cases by urging an extension of "partial
insanity" to negative the mental attitudes that are by definition
essential to a particular crime, whether it be done by proof of
borderline insanity or intoxication, although when one is thinking
of basic reforms it seems a bit like pettifogging, as do also expansions of the word "know."
Does not this approach require
distortions or redefinitions of legal concepts? Isn't there something to be said for those who would leave "intention" and the
like with their usual meanings and go into "the deeper understanding that the legal test requires-or at least would seem to require'"8 in a separate inquiry? Still, patching is indicated when
one cannot have a new suit and the patching may indicate what
the style of the new suit should be. Instances of strict or absolute
criminal liability- 9 demonstrate that the law can change; that
there are better indicia of dangerousness than guilt, indicia with
which scientists can work. The problem for the law is to develop
organizations and procedures and to establish aims that will enable the scientists-not just psychiatrists but scientists in all
fields-to work with effect.
57. Id. at 424.
58. Id. at 404.
59. Id. at 449.

